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Abstrack 
 
Meningkatnya anggaran militer China lebih dari satu dekade terakhir ini menyebabkan 
terjadinya instabilitas di kawasan Asia Timur. Hal ini terutama disebabkan karena Jepang 
merasa terancam dengan strategi China dan karenanya Jepang melakukan perubahan 
terhadap kebijakan pertahanannya. Jepang yang memiliki masalah perbatasan dengan 
China di sekitar Laut Timur, beranggapan bahwa modernisasi persenjataan China, 
terutama yang dilakukan terhadap armada lautnya, bukan ditujukan utk menciptakan 
stabilitas keamanan kawasan namun sebaliknya, menimbulkan ancaman bagi Jepang dan 
negara tetangga lainnya. Sebagai reaksi terhadap kebijakan pertahanan China tersebut, 
Jepang, di samping tetap menikmati kerjasama pertahanan dengan Amerika Serikat, telah 
memutuskan untuk merubah postur pertahanannya dan meningkatkan anggaran belanja 
militernya. Meskipun terlalu dini untuk menyatakan akan terjadi perang antara Jepang 
dan China, namun dinamika yang terjadi pada keduanya menimbulkan persepsi yang 
beragam bagi negara-negara di kawasan Asia Timur, namun yang paling mencolok adalah 
meningkatnya perasaan terancam yang akan mengarah pada security dilemma (dilema 
keamanan). 
 
Kata kunci: Modernisasi pertahanan, Instabilitas, Dilema keamanan 
 
 
The rise of China, both in military and economic over the last decade, has 
drawn attention to international politics, especially in East Asia which is the region 
I want to focus in this paper. Its defense expenditure which increased 11.7 – 20.3 
per cent1 annually brings instability to the region. Although the government of 
China has acknowledged that its military expenses are reasonable and at 
appropriate level for its economic development, it inevitably leads other states in 
the region to seek greater military capabilities, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. In response to this – as well as in relation to North Korea’s nuclear 
program – Japan, for instance, has changed its defense strategy. Instead of Russia 
being a threat as in the case during the Cold War era, China and North Korea are 
now considered a threat. This is mentioned in Japan’s Defense White Paper lately. 
Thus, Japan decided both to enhance its self-defense power and strengthen its 
alliance with United States. 
                                                          
 1 Based on China’s military expenditure from its National Defense White Paper on 1998 – 
2010,  accessed from http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-08/17/content_24165.htm 
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Obviously the security dilemma has occurred in this region. China has 
increased its military expenditure very drastically. This causes other countries in 
the region, mainly Japan - which continues to have a problem with China in East 
China Sea management - to feel vulnerable and less secure. This situation forces 
Japan to put in more efforts to modernize its defense capabilities as a response. 
Moreover, China-Japan’s action-reaction related to arms dynamics makes the 
region unstable. Therefore, the question addressed in this paper is why weapon 
acquisition process in any country can become a factor to destabilize a certain 
region. To answer this question I will examine China’s military spending and its 
impact on East Asia region, with a focus on Japan’s response.  
Accordingly, I will argue that it is due to threat perception that leads to 
security dilemma and arms race. China’s increase of military spending with the 
justification of its security and defense creates security dilemma to other states. 
Even though China has explained its reason and motive through diplomacy, it 
inevitably creates diverse perceptions towards its neighbors. The security dilemma 
happens particularly when other states perceive their neighbor’s military 
procurement as a threat. This situation forces other states in the region, mainly 
Japan, to counter-balance China’s strategy by increasing its military expenditure. 
The tension which is created by this action-reaction will heighten the feeling of 
insecure for both of them and other countries in the East Asia. This later statement 
supports Buzan’s postulation that when the action-reaction component of the arms 
dynamic remains strong, the security dilemma is active.2 Therefore to explain my 
assumption, this paper is divided into four main sections - China’s military power 
acquisition, Japan’s perception towards China’s strategy, the action-reaction model 
and instability in the region.  
 
China’s Military Power Acquisition 
Military power is obviously needed by states for certain goals and it can vary 
from one state to another. Buzan perceives that military capability is used to act 
intentionally and physically against an object or an unwilling person either 
defensively or offensively.3 On the other hand, Art tries to broaden the purposes of 
deployment of military forces by stating that it serves at least four utilities: defense, 
deterrence, compellence4 and swaggering. Although Art explained the differences 
of these purposes explicitly, in practice, these purposes can be overlapping. It may 
not be easy to distinguish each of these purposes when they are implemented. To 
some extent it is difficult to ascertain whether a state’s military power is used for 
defence, offence or both goals - particularly for states which have disputes for 
                                                          
 2 Barry Buzan & Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, Colorado, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 209. 
 3 Ibid., p. 131. 
 4 Robert J. Art use the term “compellence” instead of coercion in his article “To What Ends Military 
Power?” in International Security, Vol. 4. No. 4, Spring 1980, pp. 3-35, as he was influenced by Thomas c. 
Schelling in his Arms and Influence, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966, pp 69-86. 
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certain period of time. In addition, it is difficult to determine whether its military 
force is for deterrence or simply swaggering strategy.  
When the Chinese government issued its National Defense White Paper - 2010 
on March 2011, they declared the implementation of its peaceful development and 
pursuit of defense military strategy. The spokesman of China’s Ministry of 
National Defense mentioned that for defensive purpose, the expenditure was 
mainly used for the personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment. He 
explained that the increase of China’s military budget in the last two years is for 
improving the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s living standards of both active 
and reserve forces. In addition, the budget is also allocated for supporting the 
diversified military tasks in terms of military operations other than war 
(MOOTW), and encouraging the Revolution Military Affairs (RMA) in this 
country.5  
The above official explanation is aimed at justifying China’s rise in military 
expenditure for three reasons. Firstly, the expenditure is merely an attempt to 
maintain its weaponries. Secondly, the Chinese government is willing to 
modernize their armaments to counter non state actors’ threats – which they have 
been doing for more than a decade. Thirdly, the increase of China’s military budget 
is to provide better welfare for its military personnel in accordance with the 
increase of economic development in this country. However, this defense strategy 
threatens either its potential adversaries or actual opponents especially those who 
still have unresolved problems with China. This is not to mention that China’s 
strategy can be applied as an offence strategy. China’s defense capabilities in fact 
have the same ability to force other states either to stop what they are doing now or 
ask them to do something that it wants.  
In addition, some observers remain worried about China’s military 
modernization efforts. Its defense strategy allows Chinese government to build its 
naval, air and missile forces by procuring nuclear-powered submarines, frigates, 
amphibious landing craft warships, fighter bombers, and destroyers. These 
destroyers are also completed with supersonics and anti-ship cruise missiles. These 
procurements have been started since the year 2000.6 In 2010, China bought 15 S-
300 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia which have a range of more than 150 km and 
travel at minimum 2 km per second.7 Moreover, China has just launched its first 
air-craft carrier recently8 and obviously China will continue its military 
procurement.  
                                                          
 5White Paper of China’s National Defense in 2010, can be accessed from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm 
 6 Richard A. Bitzinger, “The China Syndromes: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming 
of Southeast Asia,” in Working Paper no. 126, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 
May 2007.  
 7“China Buys Air Defense Systems from Russia,” accessed from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/02/us-russia-china-arms-idUSTRE6310WG20100402 
 8“China Launches First Aircraft Carrier on Maiden Sea Trial,” accessed from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/10/us-china-military-carrier-idUSTRE77900D20110810 
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The Chinese government may justify its action by saying that their military 
modernization is driven at least for three reasons. Firstly, as written in its White 
Paper, it is for non-conventional threats’ anticipation. Secondly, China government 
intends to create peace and security in the East Asia region, and eventually to 
make East Asia region independent from external power.9 Nevertheless, in relation 
to anticipate non-traditional threat, China still has to manage some traditional 
problems, such as with Taiwan which poses political challenge to its “One China” 
policy. This is in addition with its problem with Japan in Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute 
in East China Sea and with some countries in South East Asia regarding South 
China Sea claim. Furthermore, China has a fragile relationship with United States 
due to its perception towards US hegemonic behavior and US security alliance 
with Japan and support given to Taiwan and South Korea. This is not to mention 
the Chinese government’s transparency in publishing its military expenses that is 
still being questioned by many observers. Therefore, its arms build-up – which is 
classified as part of arms dynamic by Barry Buzan10 - could be perceived as a 
significant threat by other states, particularly in East Asia region which I give 
attention to in this paper.  
 
Japan’s Perception towards China’s Military Transformation 
Power can be used as threats as well as rewards.11 And for realist scholars 
military power remains the most important aspect among other elements of 
national power. However, in this anarchical system the realist will argue that 
military power will make you feel more threatened than being rewarded. This 
perception is heightened when a neighbor state acquires more power than your 
state. Regarding this, Rousseau argues that the weak position of one’s military 
power increases the perception of threat. This happens because nothing in this self-
help international system can prevent one state from using force against others to 
resolve a conflict.12  
Accordingly, threat perception can be created when a state feels insecure or 
less secure due to other’s arms dynamics. Although Cohen says a threat can be 
inferred either from a certain signal of intention or the adversary’s capability,13 the 
perception itself is worsened when the motives and the reasons behind the other’s 
military build-up are ambiguity. Moreover, it is not easy to figure out a state’s 
military acquisition purpose by examining its motives and reasons stated in the 
government’s documents or declared by its spokesmen.  
                                                          
    9MG. (Prof) Zhu Chenghu, in the Seminar on “Future East Asian Security – A Chinese Perspective,” 
23 September 2011, at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. 
 10 Barry Buzan & Eric Herring, op.cit, pp. 75-82. 
 11 David L. Rousseau, “Identity, Power, and Threat Perception A Cross-National Experimental 
Study” in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 5, Oct 2007, pp. 744-771. 
 12 Ka Po Ng, Interpreting China’s Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness, NY, Taylor & Francis, 
2005, pp. 1-14. 
 13 Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis, London, The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1979, p. 5. 
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A state can explain its intention and justification to modernize its weapon 
through defense diplomacy as well as encourage confidence building measure but 
it can not stop others from having their own perception towards its strategy. When 
China explains its motive to enhance its military capabilities due to unconventional 
threats, it causes neighbor states, mainly Japan, to be uncertain. They wonder what 
kind of unconventional threats would be handled by certain kind of armaments. 
How effective will this military capability be implemented against non-traditional 
threats? Who can guarantee that its forces are not going to be applied for other 
traditional threats?  This uncertainty then causes other states to create their own 
perceptions which can be divergent. 
In fact, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation and China’s military 
transformation impacted Japan’s defense strategy significantly. This is not to 
mention the Sino-North Korea relationship, and China support to North Korea’s 
nuclear program.14 In addition, Japan-China’s economic relations are strengthened, 
but not their political and security relations.15 The memory of Japan’s invasion to 
China in World War II and their over territorial claims towards Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands are still affecting their relations. Thus, Japan views China’s effort to 
modernize its military power is an attempt that is not only aimed at dealing with 
non-traditional threats but also traditional threats. It can be used, firstly as a tool to 
expose its position in global politics. Secondly, it is used to force Taiwan with 
regards of its independence and eventually to repel Japan from Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands, as it is written in Japan’s Defense White Paper 2010: 
“In its military modernization China appears to give particular priority to 
the Taiwan issue as an issue of national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and for the time being it will probably aim for the improvement 
of military capabilities to prevent Taiwan’s independence and others, but 
in recent years, China has begun to work on acquiring capabilities for 
missions other than the Taiwan issue. The military trends of China draw 
attention from countries in the region, as the country has been steadily 
growing as a major political and economic power in the region.”16 
Japan has seen China’s arms build-up particularly in navy capabilities as a 
threat since they have the East China Sea dispute to settle. Japan-China negotiation 
on the oil and gas deposits in this sea has not come to end yet. Therefore, the 
escalation activities of Chinese naval near the gas and oil field in the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have led to Japan’s concern. Regarding this issue, a 
retired Lieutenant General and Corps Commander of Japan’s Northern Army, who 
later became a professor at Teikyo University, says, “We do not have any concern 
                                                          
 14 Russel Ong, China’s Security Interests in the 21st Century, NY, Routledge, 2007, pp. 75-86. 
 15Takenori Horimoto, “Changing Security Environment Around Japan: A Mid-Term Perspective” 
in Changing Security Dynamic in Eastern Asia: Focus on Japan, N.S. Sisodia and G.V.C. Naidu (eds), 
New Delhi, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 2005, pp. 235-256. 
 16Japan’s Defense White Paper – 2010 accessed from 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2010/11Part1_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf 
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about their land forces, only maritime forces like the navy and missiles. A drastic 
expansion of that kind of capability could be a threat in the future.”17  
Moreover, we can see that the role of media can be very important in this 
situation, as mentioned by Travis, “knowledge about and perceptions come from 
the mass media.”18 The psychological threats mostly addressed when the media 
exaggerates a state’s military procurement. With regards to the media, China has 
benefitted from the publicity. It demonstrates not only its might in both economic 
and military power at the regional and international level, but also its seriousness 
to deter any potential and actual threat towards its sovereignty and territory. On 
the other hand, Japan may feel more threatened by this publicity and may react.  
 
Action-reaction Model in East Asia 
Threat perception could lead the threatened state either to continue or 
transform its military strategy. It will continue to do so if it perceives that the 
existing strategy is still applicable in response to an adversary’s strategy. On the 
contrary it will change its strategy if it is no longer sufficient to counter-balance the 
power of its opponent. In the case of Japan-China relationship, Japanese 
government decided to change its defense strategy.19 Japan replaced its Cold War 
era defense strategy into the so-called “Dynamic Defense Force” which shifted its 
view about China and permits Japan to have power projection.20  
Regarding this action-reaction relationships, Intriligator and Brito define "arms 
race" as an interactive acquisition of weapons by two or more states.21 Hollist also 
emphasizes the Richardson’s proposition which mentions that states increase their 
military capabilities primarily in response to the increasing armaments 
expenditure of an identifiable opponent.22 Glaser also notifies that the state’s 
security environment causes the arms race. Moreover, he postulates that arms 
races are more likely when states are equally powerful.23 
                                                          
 17“Japan Moves on from the Cold War,” accessed from http:www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
pacific-12015563, in 13 September 2011. 
 18 Travis N. Ridout, “News Media Use and Perceptions of Global Threat,” presented in the 101st 
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, 2005, Washington, D.C, 
accessed from http://www.wsu.edu/pols/sage/ridout-grosse-apsa05.pdf 
 19Jennifer M. Lind, “Continuity and Change in Japanese Security Policy, in Changing Security 
Dynamic in Eastern Asia: Focus on Japan,” in Changing Security Dynamic in Eastern Asia: Focus on 
Japan, N.S. Sisodia and G.V.C. Naidu (eds), New Delhi, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 
2005, pp. 315-327. 
 20Japan’s Summary of Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2011 – 2015) accessed from 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/mid_FY2011-15.pdf 
 21Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, “Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?” in 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 1, Mar. 1984, pp. 63-84. 
  22W. Ladd Hollist, “An Analysis of Arms Processes in the United States and the Soviet Union” in 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3, Sep. 1977, pp. 503-528. 
  23Charles L. Glaser, “When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming,” in 
International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 44–84. 
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In response to China’s armed forces modernization and North Korea’s nuclear 
proliferation program which began since late 1950s, Japan has revised its defense 
strategy over the last ten years. Japanese government arranges a New Defense 
Program Outlines (NDPO) starting from 2001 which mainly prepared JSDF (Japan 
Self-Defense Forces) to support the US campaign war on terrorism in Afghanistan 
and United Nations Peace Keeping Operation. Therefore for the first time, after its 
security agreement with US in 1951, Japan was approved its own power projection 
capabilities that made it procured UH-60JA multi role helicopters, Hawk surface-
to-air missiles, landing ship tank for helicopters and destroyer-helicopter ships.24 
This strategy continued until 2009 as proposed in National Defense Program 
Guideline 2005-2009, with a stronger cooperation with US and to play a greater 
role in both regional and global security. Recently, Japan has proposed “Dynamic 
Defense Force” strategy which permits its Defense Minister to shift the land forces 
to mobile forces.  
Following what has been done by Chinese government, the government of 
Japan also increases their military spending and modernizes their armaments in 
the last 2 years. Moreover, Japanese military expenditure on 2010 exceeded 
British’s, France’s, Germany’s and Russia’s military spending and it poses the 3rd 
rank of world military expenditure, right after United States and China.25 Japan 
currently is acquiring six new submarines, equipped with two more of its warships 
with Aegis missile-defense capabilities and building three additional ground-based 
missile defense units – systems.26 Not to mention, Japan benefitted from its security 
agreement with the United States which allows it to develop and deploy it missile 
defense systems for self-defence purposes, with US technology. 
 
Instability in the Region 
Although Chinese and Japanese governments have shown dramatic power 
acquisitions both quantitatively and qualitatively, it is too early to evaluate if they 
are heading for war. The gap of military capability between China and Japan is still 
too big which causes Japan not to activate war first. In addition, to some observers, 
their interdependence in economies restrains them from doing regrettable actions 
by both countries. However, their action-reaction on arms dynamic causes an 
inevitable security dilemma in the region. Butfoy explains how this security 
dilemma is caused by the sense of threat especially when there is uncertainty in 
                                                          
  24“Japan’s New Defense Posture Towards Power Projection”, in The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies Strategic Comments, volume 10, issue 8, October 2004 accessed from 
http://www.iiss.org/Easysiteweb/getresource.axd?AssetID=699&Type=Full.pdf 
  25World Wide Military Expenditures – 2011 accessed from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/spending.htm 
  26 “Japan Shifts Defense Strategy Towards North Korea and China,” accessed from 
http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/japan/japan-shifts-defense-strategy-toward-n-korea-china-
1.129085 
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others’ perception.27 About this, Jervis perceives that security dilemma can evoke 
tensions.28  
In Sino-Japan relations, the action-reaction military strategies not only promote 
tensions for both parties, it also creates insecurity for other states in the region. 
Currently tensions coupled with some unresolved problems with neighboring 
countries trigger instability in East Asia. This is not to mention the perception of 
Japan as an invader during the World War II and the assumption of China as a 
revisionist power in the way it approaches Taiwan. Although China government 
tries to manage some negotiations and arrange economic cooperation with Taiwan, 
they still use “carrot and stick” approaches. China seems likely not to leave the use 
of coercion and intimidation to its “One China” policy, as President Hu Jintao 
ratified the “Anti-Seccession Law” in March, 2005.29 
In addition, diplomacy that is carried out by Chinese government in 
accordance with a big number and capability of military equipment tend to cause 
its neighbor states to perceive that China is going to intimidate them. Hu Jintao 
confirms that China’s peaceful development mechanism - that is aimed to justify 
its modernization - is mainly used for China-Taiwan reunification.30 Essentially, 
this emphasizes what Al Capone says, “You can get further with a kind word and a 
gun than you can with just a kind word.”31  
 
Conclusion 
The Chinese government’s decision to modernize its military capabilities 
which is supported by its amazing economic growth has its own purpose and 
logical rationale. In addition, during the implementation of its defense strategy 
over the last decade, China has been publicizing its peaceful military rise through 
diplomacy as well as media. However, it is not fully understood by its neighbor 
states in East Asia region, particularly Japan. Instead of being more confident, 
Japan feels less secure. Japan then shifts its defense strategy that views China and 
North Korea as its threat and transforms its military posture such that it becomes 
the 3rd biggest military expenditure country in the world. It inevitably brings both 
countries to enter into arms race. This arms race in turn promotes tension between 
them and their neighbors that causes the East Asia region become unstable.  
This instability is also worsened by the assumptions made by other countries 
in the region for these potential superpowers. These perceptions come up with 
their history and behavior in relation to resolve some existing problems, mainly 
                                                          
 27 A. Butfoy, “Offence-Defence Theory and The Security Dilemma: The Problem with 
Marginalizing The Context”, in Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3, December 1997, pp. 38-58. 
 28 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1976, p. 67. 
 29Wu-ueh Chang and Chien-min Chao, “Managing Stability in the Taiwan Strait: Non-military 
Policy towards Taiwan under Hu Jintao,” in Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 99-118. 
 30Eugene Tang and Janet Ong, “China Will Use Peaceful Development to Reunite Taiwan,” 
accessed from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aqr3uXRjACaw 
 31 “The Untouchables” accessed from http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094226/quotes 
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China. Thus, it is obviously to mention that China’s weapons procurement is 
destabilizing the East Asia region. 
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